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What are the implications for individual privacy in a world where
millions of people are driving Interet-enabled cars that have their
movements monitored at all times?
-IBM Chairman and CEO Lou Gerstner
Introduction
In the span of just a few decades the information age has altered
the way we communicate and brought the world closer together.
However, the new technologies of the age have brought with them an
all-too-familiar challenge-how to ensure personal privacy. In their
famous 19th-century law review article on privacy, Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis wrote words which ring equally true today:
The intensity and complexity of life... have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world... so that solitude and privacy have
become more important to the individual; but modem enterprise
and invention have, through invasions upon [a man's] privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.1
Fueled by news accounts of potential privacy abuses on the
Internet, privacy has become one of the leading concerns of
American consumers. One new technology that greatly concerns
privacy advocates is the Global Positioning System ("GPS"), a
satellite-based navigation system that can provide a consumer, and
possibly third parties, with a precise reading of the person's location.
Privacy advocates are wary of GPS because, as explained by
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law 2002; B.A.
California State University, Sacramento.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193,196 (1890).
2. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461, 1467 n. 16
(2000).
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Laurence Tribe, "[p]art of human dignity is the ability to hide. Even
in the context of someone you trust to act in your own interest, there
are a great many things with respect to your location over which you
want to retain authority."3
This note assumes that in order for GPS technology to truly
proliferate, consumers must be assured of the privacy of their
location information-a view that is shared by privacy advocates as
well as the telecommunications industry.4 Therefore, Congress,
federal regulatory agencies, state legislatures, and the courts must act
now to protect consumer privacy related to positioning technology.
Part I of this note explains GPS technology and discusses how
some of its uses have prompted concern among privacy advocates.
Part II analyzes privacy law as it exists now and discusses its
applicability to the GPS context. Finally, part III examines tort
proposals created to prevent the unauthorized release of location
information.
I. GPS Technology and Its Uses
GPS is based on a network of at least 24 satellites that
continuously send out radio signals transmitting their locations.5 A
GPS receiver back on Earth can then triangulate its three-
dimensional position using the information received from at least
four of the satellites.6 The system is accurate anywhere on Earth to
within 100 feet.7 Using a technique called differential GPS, users can
obtain accuracies of several feet.
Originally developed by the Department of Defense as a means
of navigating submarines and guiding missiles, GPS is today used in
numerous creative commercial applications, creating an expected
global market of $19 billion for GPS equipment and location services
in 2001.9
3. M.J. Zuckerman, Wireless, With Strings Attached. A Cellphone Can Make You
Stand Out, to Rescuers and Marketers Alike, USA TODAY, Feb. 7,2001, at ID.
4. Petition of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association for a
Rulemaking to Establish Fair Location Information Practices at 4-5, In the matter of
Petition for Rulemaking (Nov. 22, 2000).
5. Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
(October 1999) available at http:llwww.af.millnews/factsheetslNAVSTARGlobal_
PositioningSy.html.
6. See id
7. Id. The system now attains accuracy of within forty-eight to sixty feet after the
federal government in 2000 turned off a feature that intentionally degraded the civilian
signal. Kevin Washington, Locator System Draws Bead on Better Accuracy, BALT. SUN,
May 8,2000, at 1C.
8. David H. Freedman, Flying Made Easy, TECH. REV., Mar. 1, 2001, at 59.
9. Wireless World Will Drive GPS Applications, According to New Allied Business
Intelligence Study, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 13, 2000. Further, by 2005, the GPS market is
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Many municipalities and businesses now use the system for
vehicle fleet management," and millions of personal cars will soon
have GPS navigation available to the driver.' GPS is even used for
such exotic functions as tracking migration patterns of animals. 2
Perhaps no application has resulted in as great a proliferation of
GPS technology as the pending Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") requirement for telecommunications
companies to integrate positioning service into cellular-phone
handsets. 3 Originally, cell-phone companies were to have begun
selling location-capable handsets no later than October 1, 2001."
Mobile-service providers did not meet the deadline, however,
because they claimed that "the technology to provide the service was
still being built."'" Consequently, the FCC is now requiring
companies to file quarterly reports of their progress towards
implementing the system, with a goal that 95% of all handsets be in
compliance by 2005.16
The requirement is part of the FCC's Enhanced 911 ("E-911")
regulations which "are intended to improve the reliability of wireless
911 services, by requiring wireless carriers to provide to emergency
dispatchers information on the location from which a wireless call is
being made."' 7
Telecommunications companies may provide the requisite
positioning information through either network-based technology
(e.g., triangulation utilizing the existing cellular tower infrastructure)
expected to reach $60 billion.
10. Pat Thompson, Postal Service to Monitor Carriers with Satellite Tracking System,
FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, May 16,1996, at 4.
11. One such personal-vehicle system, OnStar, is projected to be available in over
four-million cars by 2003. Press Release, OnStar, GM's OnStar Subsidiary Brings
Location-based, Real-Time Traffic and Road Condition Information Into the Vehicle
(Nov. 13, 2000) (on file with author).
12. Jeffrey P. Cohn, Tracking Wildlife: High-tech Devices Help Biologists Trace the
Movements of Animals Through Sky and Sea, BIOSCIENCE, January, 1999, at 13.
13. FCC 911 Service Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (1999); see also Simon Romero, Location
Devices' Use Rises, Prompting Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, March 4,2001, at 1.
14. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18.
15. Suzanne King and David Hayes, Deadline Extended for 911 Technology; Location
Capability Must be in Place by 2005, FCC says, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 9,2001, at
D10.
16. FCC Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy, Separate Statement In re: Revision of
the Commission's Rules To Ensure Compatibility wvith Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling
Systems (Oct. 2,2001), available at http://wvw.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/
Statementsl2001/stkqalO6.html.
17. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adjusts Its Rules to




or through handset-based technology like GPS."8 Network-based
technologies must be able to locate callers to within 100 meters 67%
of the time, while handset-based technologies must be able to locate
callers to within 50 meters 67% of the time." Verizon Wireless and
Western Wireless have chosen to develop network-based solutions,
while Sgrint PCS, Alltel, and Nextel are developing GPS-based
systems.
The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association
("CTIA")" and others insist that new consumer benefits will abound
because of the availability of positioning information.' Through
network and handset-based technologies, a subscriber to a location
service can access driving directions, local news or weather, traffic
delay updates, and even concierge services to make dinner
reservations.' Location-sensitive content, advertising, and
personalization services are already being deployed by companies
like Airflash, ViAir, and AdForce.24
But it is precisely the technology that enables these consumer
benefits that has privacy advocates concerned.' Many fear that cell-
phone companies could use the location information to constantly
monitor the location of their customers. 6 Privacy advocates have
referred to the technology as "digital dog tags" and warned that the
information could be sold to aggressive advertisers or accessed by
criminals.'
Location information could conceivably be cross-referenced with
existing database information regarding a consumer's habits.
Voluminous information regarding consumer habits can already be
compiled via the Internet.29 "On the Internet, every Web site we visit,
18. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18.
19. Id.
20. Romero, supra note 13, at 25.
21. The organization changed its name in 2001 from the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association. The acronym CTIA remains unchanged.
22. Petition of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association for a
Rulemaking to Establish Fair Location Information Practices at 4-5, In the matter of
Petition for Rulemaking (Nov. 22,2000).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Romero, supra note 13.
26. See Hiawatha Bray, Something to Watch Over You; Your Cell Phone Is a Homing
Beacon, and Soon It Will Be Tracking Your Every Move, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22,
2001, at C1.
27. Keith Perine, Talking About Wireless Privacy, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec.
25,2000.
28. Jube Shiver Jr., Prying-Eye Phone Technology Raising Privacy Concerns, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 12,2000, at C1.
29. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 159-95 (Random House 2000).
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every store we browse in, every magazine we skim, and the amount of
time we spend skimming it, create electronic footprints that
increasingly can be traced back to us, revealing detailed patterns
about our tastes, preferences and intimate thoughts."3  Privacy
advocates fear that advertisers will combine this consumer preference
data with location information to unleash a barrage of personalized
ads onto a person's mobile phone.3 1 Imagine walking through a mall
anywhere in the nation as your cell phone rings, displaying the latest
sales prices in the store by which you are walking.
Other parties with an interest in knowing your whereabouts
could theoretically also use location information. As explained by
James Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology, "what
if your insurer finds out you're into rock climbing or late-night
carousing in the red-light district? What if your employer knows
you're being treated for AIDS at a local clinic? The potential is there
for inferences to be drawn about you based on knowledge of your
whereabouts." 2 In short, privacy advocates are concerned that cell-
phone companies will release location information to third parties-
whether the third party is a marketer, a law enforcement agency, an
employer, or a criminal.
The E-911 requirement is not the only GPS application that
concerns privacy advocates. For example, several companies are
offering GPS-based devices small enough to be worn on a tennis shoe
or around the wrist.'3 Though designed as a means for parents to
keep tabs on their children,' some privacy analysts are concerned
that the same devices will be used by stalkers and private detectives
to accurately obtain knowledge of a person's whereabouts. 5
General Motors is integrating "black box" technology into its
cars.' Coupled with GPS, the boxes could record exactly where the
30. Id. at 7.
31. Shiver, supra note 28 (explaining that "cell phone companies and marketers will
know not only who [users] are, but also where they are within a few feet and perhaps what
consumers are buying while they are in a store"); see, e.g., Anne Colden, Privacy Concerns
Expected to Grow, THE DENVER POST, Jan. 1, 2001, at E-01 (discussing the Privacy
Foundation's concerns about profiling of individuals in order to target personalized
wireless ads).
32. Romero, supra note 13, at 25.
33. Ward, supra note 33, at 1; see, e.g., Steve Shoup, Baca Fears Tracking System May
Invite Abuse, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 22, 2000, at B2 (discussing proposal by
Albuquerque mayor Jim Baca to criminalize tracking an individual without consent).
34. Ward, supra note 33, at 1 (explaining that a missing child can be pinpointed in
thirty seconds).
35. Id.; see also Colden, supra note 31.




car has been and whether the driver was breaking any driving laws.3
This formerly hypothetical scenario became reality in the summer of
2001 when an Acme Rent-A-Car franchise in New Haven,
Connecticut began fining consumers for speeding in their rented
vehicles.' The company's vehicles were equipped with GPS boxes
that recorded the location and speed of the vehicles.39 The policy
became a national news story when one consumer was fined $450 for
three separate speeding incidents.4" The consumer has since brought
suit in Connecticut state court and filed a complaint with the
Connecticut Department of Consumer Affairs.
Meanwhile, the Federal Highway Administration, along with the
states of California, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin are conducting a joint research project
about the feasibility of using GPS-based systems to collect
information from vehicles for road use charges. Insurance
companies are experimenting with a similar system designed to
charge for insurance based on miles driven. Privacy advocates fear
these records will be subpoenaed by law enforcement. 3
On the criminal front, the use of GPS has already raised a Fourth
Amendment privacy claim in at least one circuit court case.' In
United States v. Mclver, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the warrantless placement of a GPS-based tracking device by law
enforcement on the undercarriage of a suspect's vehicle.45 The court
held that the placement of the device was neither a search nor a
seizure.46
The court held it was not a search because the undercarriage is
part of the exterior of the vehicle,47 and according to the Supreme
Court in New York v. Class,' there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the exterior of a vehicle. The court held that no seizure
occurred because the device represented only a technical trespass on
37. Id.




41. States Eye GPS for Road Tax Collection, GLOBAL POSITIONING & NAVIGATION
NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000. If adopted, the system may ultimately be used in lieu of fuel taxes
by charging taxpayers per mile driven.
42. Anne Eisenberg, Buy Car Insurance By the Mile, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 24,
2000, at 1.
43. Id.




48. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
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the space occupied by the beeper, and the beeper in no way deprived
the defendant of dominion and control over his vehicle.
49
H. The Current State Of Privacy Law And It's Applicability To
GPS-Based Tracking
Privacy has been defined as "the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others."5 The
"information" referred to in this definition could include any
personal information that a person wishes to keep to herself,
including that person's exact location at any given time.
Privacy, of course, has been most widely implicated in criminal
cases by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." It has also been famously implicated by the Supreme
Court in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut.2 These cases, however,
involve the protection of personal privacy from invasion by the
federal or state governments. "Whereas the Constitution insulates
individuals from governmental intrusion into their private lives, it
does not dictate rights between private citizens."53
While the privacy of individuals to be free from governmental
intrusion is certainly implicated by the debate over GPS, criminal
procedure and the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence will most likely shape the contours of that particular
debate.m It is beyond the scope of this note to analyze the
constitutionality of law enforcement's use of GPS.5 Rather, this
paper focuses on the rights of individuals as against private parties.
A. The Invasion of Privacy Torts
A privacy tort has been recognized in the United States at least
since the publication of the famous 1890 Warren and Brandeis article
on the subject. 6 In that article, the authors explained that "[t]he
49. Mclver, 186 F.3d at 1127.
50. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York 1967).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight. A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291,298 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Mclver, 186 F.3d at 1126-27.
55. For a discussion of the law enforcement issues, the reader should consult Mclver,
id, and United States v. Karo, 458 U.S. 705 (1984) (discussing the analogous area of
tracking a suspect's vehicle with a non-GPS-based "beeper").
56. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1; Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808 (2d
Cir. 1940) (explaining that "[aill comment upon the right of privacy must stem from the
famous article by Warren and Brandeis on The Right of Privacy..."); see also Solveig
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common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others.
5 1
In "Warren and Brandeis's formulation, the 'right to privacy'
referred to a right not to have information about one's personal life
exposed to the general public by the press."58 Following publication
of the article, numerous state courts acted to incorporate the Warren-
Brandeis theory as well as several other related privacy torts. 9 There
are now four privacy torts recognized by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts: the false light tort, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the
misappropriation tort, and the tort of publicity of a person's private
life.
None of these torts applies easily to the GPS context. Any
invasion of privacy tort possibly raises an issue regarding the First
Amendment rights of the party violating the privacy. This issue will
be discussed later in the context of U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission.6'
A GPS-based claim arising under the false-light tort is unlikely
to survive a summary judgment motion because truth is a defense to
this claim.62 The potential privacy invasion concerning the use of
GPS, on the other hand, is not based on falsity, but on dissemination
of truthful information that a consumer would prefer to keep private.
For example, the fact that a woman may have recently visited an
abortion clinic may not be untrue, but is nevertheless a matter she
may prefer to keep quiet.
The misappropriation tort, meanwhile, is limited to the use of
another's name or image for commercial gain.63 It has perhaps most
widely been applied in protecting celebrities' right of publicity.6' Any
use of GPS information, on the other hand, involves not a person's
name or image, but knowledge of that person's precise whereabouts.
The public disclosure of private facts tort is conceivably available
to a GPS plaintiff. The tort arises when a party publicizes
Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97,109 (2000).
57. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
58. Zimmerman, supra note 53, at 291,295.
59. Singleton, supra note 56, at 109.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
61. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E; Singleton, supra note 56, at 110.
63. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1996) (listing
"appropriation of a plaintiff's name or likeness" as a requisite element); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C.
64. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,837 (6th Cir.
1983) (finding that television personality Johnny Carson's right of publicity was violated
where the defendant gained commercially through its use of the phrase "Here's Johnny").
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information of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and the information is not of legitimate concern to the
public.6
But application of the tort has been strictly limited. For
example, if an event takes place in a public place, the tort is
unavailable.6 After all, when a person travels over the public streets,
"he voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to look the fact that
he [is] traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact
of whatever stops he [makes], and the fact of his final destination."'67
Thus if a lender gleans from a loan applicant's cell phone records that
the applicant has spent an unusual amount of time at the horse races
lately, the applicant would probably not have a cause of action under
the public disclosure of private facts tort as it has been applied by the
courts.6s
Recovery is also not available if the fact the person desires to
keep private is not widely circulated by a defendant, but only
released to a select group of people.69 Thus, if an employer decides
not to hire a job applicant because, through exploitation of cell-phone
data, the employer discovers that the applicant makes weekly visits to
an AIDS clinic,' there would be no cause of action against the party
who released the location data for publication of private information.
Finally, if the embarrassing information is about a public figure,
the matter may usually be reported as a matter of public record.
71
The California Supreme Court explained that "[t]hose who seek
elected public positions realize that in so doing they subject
themselves, and those closely related to them, to a searching beam of
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
66. Id. at cmt. b.
67. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1982) (holding that police did not
commit a Fourth Amendment violation by using a beeper to track the location of a
suspect's automobile).
68. The fact that a person is visiting a public establishment does not always defeat an
invasion of privacy tort. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Mich. App. 1995)
(holding that the fact that women could be seen entering and exiting a public in vitro
fertilization clinic was not a defense to an invasion of privacy tort against a group of
abortion protestors who held large signs naming the plaintiffs as baby killers). Here, the
court felt that the information disclosed took place within the private confines of a clinic.
Id. It is doubtful whether this exception could be applied in the context of a visit to the
racehorses, since the confines of a racetrack are still presumably a public place.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.
70. The facts of this hypothetical differ only slightly from those of McNemar v. Disney
Stores, Inc., 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 897 (1995) (finding that there was no invasion
of privacy "to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person
or even to a small group of persons" where one Disney employee revealed to plaintiff's
boss that plaintiff was IllV-positive).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e.
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public interest and attention. ' 2 Thus, if a newspaper reporter obtains
a political candidate's cell-phone records and discovers that the
candidate has a propensity to engage in gambling, the candidate
would not likely have a cause of action.
Of all the privacy torts, the intrusion upon seclusion tort could
most easily be applied in the GPS context. This tort is available
against a person who intrudes on the solitude or seclusion of another
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.'
This intrusion need not be physical, but would include any intrusion,
such as eavesdropping, onto an individual's private concerns. 4 Thus,
it seems at first blush that if a company with positioning information
released a user's information to a third party without consumer
consent, the consumer would have a possible cause of action.
The intrusion upon seclusion tort is also limited, however. Suits
rarely succeed if the information has been gathered in a public
space.75 Thus, as with the disclosure of personal facts tort, the fact
that a person's travels to public places are observable to the public
would usually defeat any claimed right of privacy in those places.76
B. Privacy-Enhancing Legislation And The U.S. West Case
The last several years have seen a marked increase in federal
legislation introduced to deal with perceived invasion of privacy
problems.' For example, members of the 106th Congress introduced
at least twenty-seven bills addressing consumer privacy or cyber-
security and wiretapping. However, with the notable exception of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,79 virtually none of these bills passed.""
In the GPS context, the most relevant piece of legislation to pass
Congress in the last several years is the Telecommunications Act of
1996."1 As explained by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,' section
72. See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 923 (1969) (holding that a newspaper's
disclosure of the disciplinary problems of a city council candidate's teenage children did
not violate the children's right of privacy).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
74. Id. at cmt. b.
75. Singleton, supra note 56, at 111.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (explaining that there is no
liability for "observing [a person] or even taking [the person's] photograph while [the
person] is walking on the public highway...
77. Singleton, supra note 56, at 114.
78. See Privacy 106th Congress, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (2000), available
at http://www.cdt.orgllegislationl106thlprivacy/.
79. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338-1481 (1999) (limiting the use of financial
records).
80. Outgoing Congress Passes School, Library Internet Filtering Law, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY LITG. REP., Jan. 8, 2001, at 10.
81. Telecomm. Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996).
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222 of the Act, entitled "Privacy of customer information," states
that "[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the
confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to ...
customers. ' '"4
The Act places restrictions on the use, disclosure of, and access
to the Customer Proprietary Network Information ("CPNI")
gathered by telecommunications companies.' CPNI includes, among
other information, location, destination of calls, and amount of use of
a telecommunications service.' The salient section of the Act with
regards to CPNI is section 222(c)(1),' which states:
Except as required by law or with the approval of the customer, a
telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer
proprietary network information by virtue of its provision of a
telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or permit
access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network
information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications service
from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary
to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service,
including the publishing of directoriesY
The Act was amended by the Wireless Communications and
Public Safety Act of 1999" to include location information within the
definition of CPNr and to explicitly require "express prior
authorization" for a telecommunications provider to release location
information."
Though the acts taken together require customer approval
before location information and other forms of CPNI are released to
third parties, 2 it is not clear exactly what form customer approval
must take.93 The FCC is currently engaged in a rulemaking process,
initiated at the request of the CTIA, to establish fair location
information practices.'
82. U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (10th
Cir. 1999).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
84. hL § 222(a).
85. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1228.
86. 47 U.S.C. § 222(h).
87. Id. § 222(c)(1).
88. Id.
89. Pub. L. No. 106-81, 113 Stat. 1288-1289 (1999).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1).
91. Id. § 222(f).
92. U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224,1228-29 (10th
Cir. 1999).
93. Singleton, supra note 56, at 115.
94. See, e.g., Comments of Cingular Wireless, LLC, In the Matter of Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association's Petition for Rulemaking To Establish Fair
Location Information Practices (Apr. 6, 2001), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/cgi-
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Whatever form customer approval is required by regulation to
take, such regulations will possibly face First Amendment challenge
as being a violation of commercial speech. Such a First Amendment
challenge was successfully raised by a telecommunications company
in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,' in
response to the regulations promulgated by the FCC to implement
the Telecommunications Act.
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
before Congress amended the Act to require express customer
authorization, some industry advocates argued for an "opt-out," or
"implied approval" system where carriers would simply have to
provide some sort of notice of their intent to use CPNI and a
mechanism for customers to withdraw.96 Consumer advocates argued
for an "opt-in" approach to obtaining customer consent,9 meaning
that "a carrier would have to obtain prior express approval from a
customer through written, oral, or electronic means before using the
customer's CPNI."9 The desire for an opt-in system stemmed from a
concern that many consumers would not be sufficiently aware of their
telecommunication company's intent to use CPNI, and so would not
be vigilant enough to opt-out of the program.' A third approach, the
most restrictive on industry, would have required carriers to obtain
written consent before releasing CPNI.'"
Because the statute was ambiguous as to how
telecommunications carriers were to obtain customer approval,"' the
FCC, at the request of several telecommunications companies, 10
acted in 1998 to clarify the law by administrative order." The FCC
order adopted the opt-in approach, reatuiring customer approval
through oral, written, or electronic means.
A telecommunications company named U.S. West, Inc.,
concerned that the opt-in approach was more expensive and would
result in a lower customer approval rate,"5 brought suit challenging
the FCC's opt-in requirement."'6 Specifically U.S. West alleged the
bin/websql/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.hts.
95. 182 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1999).
96. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1240, 1246 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1240.
98. Id. at 1230.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1246 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1240 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (noting that the FCC found that the statute was
ambiguous in that it did not specify the type of approval required).
102. Id. at 1229.
103. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007 (1998).
104. Id. § 64.2007(b).
105. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1240 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1228.
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FCC regulation infringed U.S. West's First Amendment right to
engage in commercial speech."
The court held that U.S. West's right to commercial speech was
implicated," and so applied a three-factor test from Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New
York.'09 In order for a regulation to be valid under Central Hudson:
(1) the government must have a substantial state interest in
regulating the speech, (2) the regulation must directly and materially
advance that interest, and (3) the regulation must be no more
extensive than necessary to serve the interest."' Applying this test,
the Tenth Circuit found that the opt-in approach neither materially
advanced a state interest, because the FCC only proved protecting
privacy was important in the abstract;... nor was it narrowly tailored,
because the FCC did not prove an opt-out strategy would not work.'
The U.S. West decision can be criticized on many grounds,
including that U.S. West was actually objecting to Congress' law and
not the FCC's interpretation of it, that the CPNI order does not really
restrict speech, and that the court underestimated the importance of
privacy! It is not the purpose of this note, however, to offer a
critique of the court's constitutional analysis. Rather, this note calls
attention to the current state of privacy law with respect to location
information.
If an opt-in requirement really violates the First Amendment
rights of telecommunications companies, the only obvious less-
restrictive option is an opt-out (i.e., implied approval) requirement.
But the opt-out requirement offers very little protection to consumers
who will not take the time to read the fine print at the bottom of a
telecommunications contract.
Further, even if an opt-in requirements does withstand
constitutional scrutiny, the Telecommunications Act offers little
recourse to consumer for a violation of the Act. Though the Act
creates a cause of action for violation of its terms, 4 several courts
have held that a party must demonstrate damage to state a cause of
action. In Conboy v. AT&T Corp.,"5 for example, a couple who had
an unlisted telephone number brought suit after AT&T released their
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CPNI to an AT&T-affiliated credit-card company which was trying to
collect a debt from the couple's daughter-in-law. 16 The court granted
summary judgment to AT&T because the plaintiffs could not
deomonstrate that they suffered any damages."1 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that the monthly fee they paid to AT&T
included "the privacy protections of the Telecommunications Act.1 .8
The fact that the plaintiffs received between thirty and fifty calls from
the credit card company during a two-month span in 1998"' also
apparently did not represent a significant-enough harm to state a
cause of action. Because the harm suffered as a result of an invasion
of privacy is difficult to quantify in monetary terms,12 it will be
difficult for parties to state a cause of action for a provider's violation
of the Act.
Finally, even if the opt-in approach seemingly required by the
1999 amendments 121 does withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Act
offers no protection for people whose privacy is violated through
non-cell-phone based collections of location information. The
speeding rental car customer continues to have no recourse under
federal legislation or through the state courts.
Lll.Proposals for Ensuring the Privacy of Location Information
GPS brings with it innumerable consumer benefits. But in order
for customers to freely avail themselves of those benefits, they must
first trust the technology. This opinion is shared by many in the
telecommunications industry. The Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association, for example, explained in their brief to the FCC
that "privacy concerns regarding location information must be
addressed if new services are be [sic] accepted by consumers.
''2
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117. Id. at 499-500.
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Thus, it is imperative that either Congress or the courts act soon to
ensure consumer privacy.
The First Amendment issue addressed in U.S. West can be raised
generally as a defense to any legislation or judicially-created tort
aimed at strengthening privacy rights at the expense of corporations.
In this way, the U.S. West opinion stands as an indication of the type
of obstacle that policymakers must overcome to ensure consumer
privacy. This is not an insurmountable challenge.
Even the FCC's opt-in regulations would arguably pass the
Central Hudson test if the FCC provided a more specific explanation
of consumer privacy interests at stake and the regulation was
narrowly tailored. Further, as Judge Briscoe explained in his dissent
in U.S. West, some privacy legislation "arguably promotes the First
Amendment rights of consumers by allowing them to call whom they
wish when they wish without fear that their calling records will be
disclosed to others."' ' In short, carefully crafted legislation narrowly
tailored to preserve the privacy rights of consumers should withstand
First Amendment scrutiny.
Another obstacle legislators will be forced to overcome is vocal
industry opposition to new privacy legislation. As of March, 2001,
business groups were gearing up to oppose new legislative
proposals.1 4  Two recently released industry-funded studies have
argued that proposed restrictions on companies' ability to collect and
use consumer information for marketing would dampen the national
economy and trigger a 7% rise in prices for Internet and catalog
purchases.'" Meanwhile, an industry coalition including IBM, Ford,
and Proctor & Gamble, planned a $30 million national advertising
campaign for fall, 2001, aimed at reducing consumer fears about
privacy.
26
Industry lobbying efforts have proved successful in the past.
During the 2000 state legislative sessions, industry banded together to
defeat "a barrage of privacy legislation, with only very few
comprehensive bills enacted."27
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A. A New Privacy Tort?
One bill, introduced in the California Legislature by Senator
Steve Peace, contained a provision establishing a new invasion of
privacy tort."s Though the version of the bill ultimately enacted did
not contain that tort provision, 9 the provision nevertheless serves as
an example of a workable solution to the location information
problem. The deleted clause read:
There shall be a cause of action for the unlawful disclosure of any
personal information gathered by a commercial or government
entity for a commercial or governmental purpose which that entity
subsequently releases to a third party without the express
permission of the person to whom the information relates. It shall
be presumed in any proceeding authorized by this section that the
person to whom the information released relates has sustained
damages thereby.'
Such a bill, largely because it presumes damages, would be an
excellent deterrent to prevent companies who collect location
information from releasing that information without customer
consent. Of course, the tort would have to be narrowly tailored and
include a well-articulated state interest to be immune from the type
of First Amendment argument advanced by the plaintiffs in U.S.
West.
B. The European Union Model
The European Union has adopted a very thorough model of
privacy legislation.' Individuals must be informed and given the
right to object before any transfer of information to a third party
takes place.'32 Further, an individual must give explicit consent before
a party can process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and health or sex life.'33 This comprehensive legislation
offers the consumer very specific protections and can serve as a
model for American legislation.
The European directive was passed, however, at a time when the
availability of location information was not an imminent problem.
Any American legislation based on the European model should offer
adequate protection of a customer's right to privacy in their own
location information by disallowing the trading of location
128. S. 129, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as amended Aug. 26, 1999).
129. Id. (enacted).
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information absent explicit customer permission and creating a cause
of action with a presumption of damages.
Conclusion
From reduced car insurance, to increased personal security, to
real-time, location-based personal services, GPS stands poised to ease
our daily lives. In order for GPS to achieve its potential, however,
legislators, courts, businesses, and the public at large must first deal
with some very real privacy issues. After all, only if the public trusts
a technology can they truly come to rely on it.
Under the current state of privacy law, the public cannot be
expected to trust businesses who collect location information. Thus,
legislators and courts must act now to establish a legal framework for
protection of personal location information. State legislative
proposals and a European Union directive offer some promising legal
options - it is now up to Congress, state legislatures, and the courts to
see to it that those options are explored.

